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ABSTRACT 
This essay explores two possible copyright regimes. The first uses 
costless and perfect price discrimination to enable copyright owners to 
capture the full market or exchange value of their work. The second also 
uses costless and perfect price discrimination, but allows copyright own-
ers to capture only the persuasion cost for authoring and distributing a 
work. We can call the first regime, costless copyright maximalism, and 
the second, costless copyright minimalism. The choice between these two 
regimes is primarily distributional: Should we design copyright to allo-
cate the surplus associated with copyrighted works to copyright owners 
or to copyright consumers?  This essay explores why this distributional 
choice matters and explains why copyright minimalism is the choice we 
should make. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times . . . .”1 
* University Distinguished Professor, Texas A&M University. I would like to thank participants at
the 2019 Akron IP Roundtable and participants at the 2020 Works-in-Progress IP Colloquium for 
their helpful feedback. 
1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 1 (1866). 
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Imagine, if you will, a world of perfect information, where 
transactions are costless, and in that world, two possible copyright 
regimes.2 The first enables copyright owners to engage in perfect price 
discrimination with respect to every form of access to their original works 
of authorship. In this regime, a copyright owner captures the full exchange 
or market value of its work, as measured by the maximum price each and 
every consumer is willing to pay for access. In that sense, the regime 
provides a value-based return to authorship. Such a regime necessarily 
provides incentives sufficient to ensure the creation and distribution of 
every socially valuable work. Therefore, it avoids the risk of dynamic 
efficiency losses from insufficient incentives. At the same time, by using 
perfect price discrimination, it does so without imposing any deadweight, 
static efficiency, or “access” losses. I will call this first regime “costless 
copyright maximalism.” 
The second regime is similar but differs in one key respect. Like the 
first, the second regime enables copyright owners to engage in perfect 
price discrimination with respect to every form of access to their original 
works of authorship. As a result, like the first, it provides incentives 
without imposing deadweight losses. Thus, it too avoids the risk of access 
losses. However, unlike the first regime, the second caps the incentives a 
copyright owner is entitled to capture for any given work at the minimum 
amount an owner will accept for authoring and distributing that work—
the copyright owner’s persuasion cost.3 Turn-about is fair play after all. 
In a world where we can gather the information necessary to charge 
consumers the maximum price each will pay for access, we should also 
be able to gather the information necessary to pay a work’s owner the 
minimum it4 will accept for authoring and distributing the work. By 
enabling a copyright owner to capture precisely its persuasion cost for 
authoring and distributing a work, this second regime provides a cost-
based return on authorship. Nevertheless, because the regime matches that 
return to each copyright owner’s precise persuasion cost for authoring and 
2. Of course, in such a world, there would be no efficiency justification for copyright. See R. 
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). That’s the point of this example. 
3. In a world of perfect information, there should be no risk or uncertainty as to whether any 
given work of authorship will prove popular, and, if so, how popular. As a result, there should be no 
need for the successful works to cross-subsidize the unsuccessful works. To the extent risk or uncer-
tainty remains, copyright owners will factor it into their persuasion costs. Thus, if a work costs $1 to 
author and distribute and has only a one in ten chance of success, then the copyright owner’s persua-
sion cost for the work would be $10. 
4. I use “it” intentionally here to recognize that the most valuable copyrights are almost in-
variably corporate-owned. 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/5
2019] A TALE OF TWO COPYRIGHTS 989 
distributing the work, the second regime also provides sufficient 
incentives to ensure the creation and distribution of every socially 
desirable work. As a result, the second regime, like the first, avoids any 
dynamic efficiency losses from providing too little incentives. I will call 
this second regime “costless copyright minimalism.” 
In this essay, I consider which of these two regimes we should adopt. 
While this may seem a mere academic or hypothetical exercise, it is not. 
As machine learning and big data enable increasingly perfect price 
discrimination, the choice between these two regimes is coming 
increasingly within our grasp. Moreover, many recent legislative efforts 
in copyright reflect, though perhaps not consciously, a choice between 
these two regimes. The adoption of Article 17 in Europe and the Music 
Modernization Act’s requirement that certain music services pay royalties 
for the public performance of pre-1972 sound recordings are two recent 
examples. The question then becomes: In a world where costless and 
perfect price discrimination is possible, should copyright owners receive 
the value-based return of costless copyright maximalism or the cost-based 
return of costless copyright minimalism? 
Usually to answer questions regarding optimal copyright design, we 
turn to the so-called incentives-access balance. Unfortunately, it provides 
no help in choosing between these two copyright regimes. Both regimes 
provide seemingly optimal incentives with no lost access. The central 
difference between the two regimes is distributional. In the first, copyright 
allocates the surplus associated with works of authorship to copyright 
owners. In the second, copyright allocates that surplus to copyright 
consumers. Yet, so long as the total amount of surplus at stake is the same, 
traditional efficiency-based approaches would largely profess 
indifference between the two regimes. Whether we allocate a given 
surplus to copyright owners as producer surplus or to consumers as 
consumer surplus, it neither changes creative output nor limits access. In 
that sense, the consequences of the choice are merely distributional, and 
thus from an efficiency perspective, uninteresting.5 
In this essay, I explore why that response is wrong. Distributional 
concerns matter. Indeed, if we are honest about the current state of 
economics, they are often all that matters, or at least, all about which we 
can say anything definitive.6 Consider, for example, three possible 
5. For the clearest articulation of the position, see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2006).  
6. Modern law and economics rely almost entirely on partial equilibrium models to support
normative conclusions. Yet, we have known since Lipsey and Lancaster’s work in the 1950s that such 
models are almost entirely useless for that purpose. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General 
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solutions to excess carbon dioxide emissions. In the first, nation states that 
supply fossil fuels, including coal, natural gas, and oil, join together and 
form a cartel to inflate the price of these energy sources. In the second, 
private, but publicly-owned companies that supply fossil fuels join 
together and form a cartel to inflate the price of these energy sources. In 
the third, nation states that consume fossil fuels join together and enact a 
carbon tax to inflate the cost of using these energy sources. There are 
important differences in: (i) the viability of each of these approaches—
whether they can impose a surcharge on fossil fuel consumption; and (ii) 
the manner in which each would determine the surcharge’s magnitude. 
Yet, from an efficiency perspective, each of the three would raise the price 
of fossil fuels and thereby achieve the overarching goal of reducing fossil 
fuel consumption. The principal difference between them is distributional. 
The choice of solution determines who collects and redistributes the 
surcharge. In the first, the fossil fuel producing states collect the surcharge 
and determine how it is allocated. In the second, fossil fuel companies 
collect the surcharge and determine its allocation. In the third, fossil fuel 
consuming states collect the surcharge and determine its allocation. 
As a historical matter, beginning in the 1970s, we chose a version of 
the first approach, albeit unintentionally.7 Whatever quibbles we may 
have about whether the surcharge the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries has imposed is high enough to adequately reduce 
fossil fuel consumption,8 it has been the distributional consequences of 
that choice that have mattered thus far. Those distributional consequences 
have changed the world we live in. For example, that distributional choice 
Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (showing that even simple partial equilibrium 
conclusions, such as monopoly in a given market reduces social welfare and should be replaced with 
competition, become unreliable in the presence of imperfections in other markets). 
7. I recognize that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) did not form
to combat the risk of global warming. Yet, OPEC, through the surcharges it has imposed on oil prices 
since the 1970s, has done more to reduce carbon dioxide emissions over the last 50 years than any 
other organization. For data on the likely CO2 emissions but-for OPEC, and those with OPEC, see 
footnote 8 infra.  
8. To get some sense for this, we can compare CO2 emissions for countries that export oil
and otherwise similar countries that do not. For example, the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
estimates per capita CO2 emissions by country. In the Middle East, it divides the countries into those 
that export oil (Middle East A countries) and those that do not (Middle East B countries). The CO2 
emissions per capita for the Middle East A countries in 2017 was 20.7 tons per year. The CO2 emis-
sions per capita for the Middle East B countries was roughly two tons per year. The IEA similarly 
divides otherwise similar Asian states into Asia A, consisting of oil exporters, and Asia B, consisting 
of non-oil-exporting countries. Again, the CO2 emissions per capita for the Asia A countries was 
roughly 6.5 tons per year, where the CO2 emissions per capita for the Asia B countries were only 
roughly one ton per year. World CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (2019), Data and Statistics, 
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, www.iea.org/statistics [https://perma.cc/2PW3-BAVL]. 
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provided at least some of the funding for, and thus contributed to, the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.9 Those attacks 
in turn led the United States to war in Afghanistan. Roughly 2,300 
American deaths and a much larger number of Afghan deaths resulted—
all due to a distributional concern.10 
This example is not atypical. Throughout human history, those who 
control the economic surplus that our civilizations have created have 
reshaped the face of our world. When governments controlled that 
surplus, we have gotten, just to name a few examples, the pyramids, the 
Taj Mahal, the Great Wall of China, any number of wars, and the Apollo 
moon landings. When religion11 controlled that surplus, we have gotten, 
among other things, the cathedrals of Europe, the Crusades, and the 
Spanish Inquisition. When private individuals have controlled that 
surplus, we have gotten an idiosyncratic mixture of charitable endeavors 
and displays of conspicuous consumption.12 We have even gotten 
charitable endeavors that are themselves displays of conspicuous 
consumption. 
Distributional concerns matter. We should not ignore them or 
relegate them to secondary status. Of course, just as with efficiency 
concerns, we cannot always foresee how distributional choices will play 
out or what consequences they may bring. Nevertheless, there are 
principles we can use to consider our distributional choices. Those 
principles focus on two subsidiary questions: (i) to whom we should 
allocate society’s surplus; and (ii) whether we should concentrate that 
surplus among the few, however chosen, or disperse it widely among the 
many. 
9. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the funds to support Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks 
came from donations “primarily in the Gulf countries and particularly Saudi Arabia.” THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 170 (2004). For Saudi Arabia, the petroleum sector accounts for roughly 87% 
of Saudi budget revenues, 90% of export earnings, and 42% of GDP. Best Countries for Business, 
FORBES (2018), https://www.forbes.com/places/saudi-arabia/ [https://perma.cc/9H6U-WZYZ]. 
10. For American casualties, see U.S. Department of Defense, Casualty Status as of 10 a.m.
EDT, July 6, 2020 (available at https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf). For Afghani casualties, see 
Friends Committee on National Legislation, Costs of War: By the Numbers, Mar. 15, 2011 (available 
at https://www.fcnl.org/updates/costs-of-war-by-the-numbers-396) (estimating 43,000 civilian casu-
alties in Afghanistan since 2001 and 64,000 local military and police). 
11. I recognize that sometimes religion and government have overlapped. 
12. For examples from either end of the spectrum, compare Warren Buffett, My Philanthropic 
Pledge (2010) (available at https://givingpledge.org/Pledger.aspx?id=177) (pledging to give 99 per-
cent of his wealth to philanthropic causes), with the ten most expensive watches in the world. See Top 
10 Most Expensive Watches, Feb. 16, 2020 (available at https://www.wpdiamonds.com/top-10-ex-
pensive-watches/) (listing ten watches ranging in price from $5 million to $55 million). 
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As we think through a distributional choice, we need to be careful 
not to let efficiency-based principles color our thinking. “Eat what you 
kill,” “reap where you have sown,” and other similar principles rest on 
thinly disguised consequentialist impulses. Following these principles, the 
impulse suggests, will put more food on the table. It can be hard to 
disentangle these impulses and consider a distributional choice as purely 
and simply distributional. However, that is my goal here. In our tale of 
two copyrights, awarding more of the surplus to either copyright owners 
or copyright consumers will not change creative output, nor will it change 
access to that output. I know that runs against our intuitions. The copyright 
industries have spent years persuading all of us that more money for them 
will mean more and better works of authorship for consumers. That naïve 
consequentialism is hard to put aside; but that is what I ask you to do. In 
our tale of two copyrights, awarding the surplus to copyright owners will 
not lead to more and better works. Awarding the surplus to copyright 
consumers will not lead to fewer and worse. 
The choice between the two copyright regimes is thus purely and 
simply distributional. Given that, the question becomes: How should we 
make it? My answer rests primarily on the second subsidiary principle. 
Specifically, we should adopt the copyright regime that will help 
distribute the available surplus as evenly as possible across society. That 
principle does not, however, resolve entirely our choice. As a general 
matter, copyright markets are winner-takes-all. As a result, broader 
copyright protection tends to concentrate surplus in the hands of the lucky 
few. In my view, this is undesirable. To avoid concentrating society’s 
surplus in the hands of the few, we should generally prefer costless 
copyright minimalism. However, there is one situation where costless 
copyright maximalism may help disperse, rather than concentrate, 
surplus. Specifically, if the work of authorship is distributed through a 
natural monopoly intermediary, then at least in some cases broader 
copyright may help disperse the available surplus. 
Section II frames the issue by examining the distributional choices 
reflected in the Music Modernization Act (“MMA”) and by exploring the 
so-called value-gap argument that was the principal basis for enacting 
Article 17 in the European Union. Before critically examining the 
distributional preferences on which these legislative measures focused, 
Section III identifies residual efficiency concerns that may remain even in 
our theorized “costless” copyright regimes. As I have shown and explored 
elsewhere, incentives and access do not fully encompass the relevant 
efficiency concerns copyright implicates. Section IV then examines the 
central issue of this essay: if it is only the distributional question at issue, 
6
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how should copyright seek to allocate the surplus associated with original 
works of authorship? Section V revisits Article 17 and the so-called value 
gap argument that was its principal justification. Section VI concludes. 
II. DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS IN RECENT COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION
Distributional arguments that reflect the same choice as our tale of 
two copyrights have supported two of the most important recent 
legislative efforts to update copyright law. In 2018, in the United States, 
Congress passed the MMA. Among other provisions, the MMA required 
streaming services to compensate sound recording artists for the public 
performance of their pre-1972 sound recordings. There is no plausible 
argument that bestowing this retroactive windfall for work done, at a 
minimum 46 years ago, will lead those artists and rights holders to 
produce more or better music, either then or now. Instead, the argument 
is distributional. Streaming services are making money on this music. 
They should therefore have to share what they have earned with these 
rights holders. The proposition is not that this forced sharing and resulting 
windfall will lead to the desirable consequence of more and better music. 
It is the redistribution itself that is the desired consequence. Implicitly, the 
MMA reflects the principle of our theorized costless copyright 
maximalism regime. It adopts the view that copyright should strive to 
allocate more of the surplus associated with works of authorship to 
copyright owners and related rights holders. 
Similarly, the so-called value gap provided the principal argument 
used to justify the European Parliament’s adoption of Article 17 in 2018. 
It too was primarily distributional. Sir Paul McCartney defined the value 
gap in his July 3, 2018 open letter to the members of Parliament in the 
following terms: “The value gap is that gulf between the value these [User 
Upload] platforms derive from music and the value they pay creators.”13 
The International Federation for the Phonographic Industries (IFPI) 
defined it similarly, putting specific numbers to the gap: “YouTube, for 
example, pays less than €1 per user per year; in contrast, Spotify pays 18 
times that figure. This gulf between the value of music exploited and 
compensation to creators is known as the Value Gap.”14 
13. Letter from Sir Paul McCartney to European Parliament, IFIB (July 3, 2018),
https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/EuropeanParliamentSupportLetterJuly2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KM4K-YS3Y]. 
14. THE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE: 5 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW (2018), 
https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/European_Copyright_A3_Poster.PDF [https://perma.cc/88B6-
CLQB]. 
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Just as with the MMA and pre-1972 sound recordings, the value gap 
argument used to justify Article 17 is primarily distributional. YouTube 
is making lots of money from music. It should have to share more of that 
with rights holders who produce that music. Again, the implicit principle 
is copyright maximalism. Copyright should strive to allocate more of the 
surplus associated with works of authorship to copyright owners and 
related rights holders. 
Unlike the MMA argument however, the value gap argument, 
although primarily distributional, offers at least the possibility of potential 
efficiency or consequential gains. Article 17 is not mere retroactive 
windfall. By redistributing surplus from YouTube to rights holders, there 
is at least some possibility that Article 17 will increase creative output. To 
the extent Article 17 is successful in redistributing rents from YouTube to 
rights holders, some of those rents may go to currently active artists. The 
rent redistribution may thus provide the sort of incentives for creative 
work at the margins of profitability that can lead to increased creative 
output. 
Proponents of the legislation were quick to offer this possibility. The 
IFPI, for example, raised the specter that unless the value gap was closed, 
creative output would collapse: “If large technology platforms can exploit 
artists’ content without paying fair license fees, we risk losing the next 
generation of Europe’s artists and musicians.”15 Of course, the IFPI 
offered no evidence on the magnitude or severity of this risk. Instead, it 
merely raised the fearful possibility that a whole generation of artists and 
musicians might be lost if Parliament did not act. 
This sort of fearmongering is a common approach for proponents of 
broader copyright. There is very little real evidence that copyright has ever 
increased creative output,16 and none that it increases creative output in 
the digital world in which we are now living. Yet, time and time again, 
15. Id. 
16. The only empirical evidence that copyright has ever increased creative output comes from 
a study that finds a correlation between copyright’s enactment and increased creative output of Italian 
operas in the 19th century. See Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyrights and Creativity: Evidence 
from Italian Opera in the Napoleonic Age, (May 16, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2505776 
[https://perma.cc/2APN-AUFJ]. Among other difficulties with the study, the most telling is the failure 
to account for confounding events. Specifically, the study focuses on a time period when France an-
nexes two Italian states and imposes French copyright on them. Of course, at the same time as France 
imposed its copyright, it also imposed other aspects of the French legal system and appointed French 
governors to oversee the states. Given so many changes at the same time, it becomes difficult to 
reliably identify which change played what causal role. Maybe the increased opera production (if it 
occurred) was due to the adoption of French copyright. On the other hand, maybe the French governor 
was a fan of opera, and the increased opera production (again, if it occurred) was patronage driven. 
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the proponents of broader copyright insist that if something is not done, 
creative output will collapse and civilization as we know it will end.17 For 
example, in 1982, during the hearings surrounding the Sony Corp. 
decision, one of the law firms representing the Motion Picture Association 
of America boldly proclaimed: “Unless Congress acts to compensate 
copyright owners for the home taping of their intellectual property, the 
audiovisual marketplace will become a barren wasteland of programming 
that does not edify, nor inspire, nor entertain.”18 Of course, Congress did 
not act to compensate copyright owners for home taping. And if you have 
watched television recently, you know that the MPAA was right: 
television has become a barren wasteland. 
In my recent book, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN 
THE US RECORDING INDUSTRY,19 I presented the first comprehensive and 
rigorous empirical test of the relationship between copyright, money, and 
creative output. The book examined the recording industry over a 55-year 
period from 1961 through 2015. This was a period of momentous change 
for the industry. During these 55 years, Congress first established the 
sound recording copyright for works fixed after February 1972, and then 
the rise of file sharing in 1999 effectively gutted it.20 Accompanying this 
legal rise and technological fall of the sound recording copyright were 
very large movements in industry revenue. At the start of the study, the 
industry was earning under $4 billion annually from shipments of 
recorded music in constant $2013.21 Even without a sound recording 
copyright, revenue from annual shipments rose somewhat from 1961 
through 1971.22 Nevertheless, from 1961 through 1969, revenue from 
shipments of recorded music remained generally low, averaging $6.9 
billion ($2013) annually. With the enactment of the sound recording right, 
17. See Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 125 (2011). 
18. JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF 
THE VCR 229 (1987); see also Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 142 (1983) (“Unless we 
do something to insure that the creators of the material are not exploited by the electronics revolution, 
that same revolution which will make it possible for almost every household to have an audio and 
video recorder will surely undermine, cripple, and eventually wash away the very industries on which 
it feeds . . . .”) (statement of Howard Oliver, Executive Secretary, American Federation of Television 
and Radio Artists). 
19. GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE US RECORDING 
INDUSTRY (2018). 
20. Id. at 59–74. 
21. Id. at 68. 
22. Id. at 68–69. 
9
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annual revenue from recorded music rose more substantially. It was not 
always a steady rise. Rather, revenue from recorded music rose and fell in 
the 1970s and 1980s with the ebb and flow of the economy generally. 
Nevertheless, shipments in the 1970s and 1980s averaged $11.0 billion 
($2013) annually. This was a nearly 60% increase over annual shipment 
revenue in the 1960s. The enactment of the sound recording copyright in 
1971 helped transfer some $82.5 billion ($2013) from copyright 
consumers to copyright owners during the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, 
a combination of law, technology, and a growing economy pushed sales 
of recorded music to a peak of $20.7 billion ($2013) in 1999.23 Taken as 
a whole, the 1990s represented the peak revenue decade for the recording 
industries over the last seventy years. From 1990 to 1999, revenue from 
shipments of recorded music averaged $17.5 billion ($2013) annually. 
This represented another nearly 60% increase in annual shipment revenue 
compared to the 1970s and 1980s. By forcing consumers to pay more for 
music, copyright helped redistribute $64.6 billion ($2013), compared to 
the 1970s and 1980s, and $105.8 billion ($2013), compared to the 1960s, 
from consumers to the recording industry during the 1990s. Fortunately 
for music lovers, in 1999, Napster opened its virtual doors, and, with the 
rise of file sharing, industry revenue from shipments of recorded music 
began to fall.24 This post-file sharing era presented a challenging time for 
the recording industry. By 2014, shipment revenue had fallen to under $7 
billion ($2013)—a level not seen since 1966.25 From 2000 through 2014, 
revenue from recorded music averaged $12.1 billion annually—a 31% fall 
from the peak revenue 1990s. 
This rise and fall of the sound recording right, and the corresponding 
rise and fall in industry revenue from shipments of recorded music, 
provides an excellent natural experiment to test for a relationship between 
increased revenue and increased music output. Copyright’s 
consequentialist premise is that paying more money to the recording 
industry in return for popular music will yield more and better music. As 
a hypothesis, it seems simple, intuitive, and straightforward. Too bad it 
was wrong. 
For the recording industry, from 1961 through 2015, more money 
was not associated with more or better music. Using four different 
measures of music output that considered both quantity and quality, I 
performed hundreds of regressions searching for the supposed positive 
23. Id. at 68. 
24. Id. at 69–75. 
25. Id. at 75. 
10
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correlation between revenue and music output.26 Yet, I could find no such 
correlation. Increased revenue for the music industry did not lead to more 
and better music. To the contrary, where a statistically significant 
correlation was present, it was negative.27 Over the last 60 years, more 
money led to less music, ceteris paribus. 
Little wonder then that proponents of broader copyright have shifted 
from consequentialist justifications for copyright legislation to 
distributive and fairness concerns. There is simply no evidence that 
effective copyright protection increases creative output. There is, 
however, mounting evidence that effective copyright protection reduces 
it. Unable to mount any plausible efficiency-based arguments, proponents 
of broader copyright argue that redistributing more of society’s wealth to 
copyright owners is desirable for its own sake. Before we move to 
examine those distributional arguments directly, there remain some 
crucial efficiency concerns we must first consider. 
III. EFFICIENCY CONCERNS BEYOND INCENTIVES AND ACCESS
In our two copyright regimes, by assuming perfect price 
discrimination, we have eliminated the potential for lost access. With 
perfect price discrimination, anyone who desires access to a work for any 
reason will get that access at a price they are willing to pay. No one will 
be denied access simply because they cannot afford to pay as much as 
someone else. To the extent that the incentives-access paradigm purports 
to offer a complete accounting of copyright’s efficiency costs and 
benefits, eliminating the potential for lost access would seem to have 
eliminated copyright’s costs. Unfortunately, lost access is not the only 
efficiency cost that copyright generates. As a result, even with perfect 
price discrimination, copyright maximalism is far from costless. 
If we assume that a new work of authorship costs $1 to produce and 
distribute and has a value of $10, measured by the willingness of 
consumers to pay, the choice our two copyright regimes presents is 
whether the $9 surplus should be allocated to the copyright owner or to 
the work’s consumers. Even in the absence of lost access, assigning that 
surplus to the copyright owner through copyright maximalism would 
impose three types of efficiency costs. First, assigning the surplus to the 
copyright owner would lead the copyright owner to expend resources in 
an attempt to capture that surplus.28 Such rent-seeking expenditures would 
26. Id. at 84–156. 
27. Id. at 120–21, 155–56. 
28. See id. at 24–30. 
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impose an efficiency loss by converting some of the available surplus into 
cost. Second, assigning the surplus to the copyright owner would push 
some authors and artists onto the backward-bending portion of the labor 
supply curve.29 By doing so, copyright maximalism would reduce the 
creative output of our most popular artists and authors. Third, assigning 
the surplus to the copyright owner would reduce social welfare by 
encouraging overinvestment in, and hence overproduction of, original 
works of authorship.30 With copyright maximalism, resources would be 
devoted to creating new works of authorship even when society would 
more highly value their use elsewhere in the economy. 
Each of these efficiency concerns suggests that even our theorized 
regime of costless copyright maximalism would not, in fact, be costless. 
Each justifies, from an efficiency-based perspective, a preference for 
copyright minimalism over copyright maximalism. However, in order to 
focus on the distributional issue directly, for purposes of this essay, I will 
put these costs to one side and assume that they do not exist. This brings 
us squarely to the question presented: How should the surplus be 
distributed if it is purely a distributional issue? 
IV. SENSIBLE DISTRIBUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Before answering that question, I should briefly address the 
argument that the surplus associated with a work of authorship can and 
should be allocated based solely upon but-for factual causation. 
Obviously, the notion that we might award value to the one who created 
it can seem innocuously sensible. However, the assertion that one person 
has created something of value fundamentally misunderstands the nature 
of value in competitive markets. If we define value as the price a consumer 
is willing to pay to avoid doing without, that price, and hence the thing’s 
value, will necessarily depend upon how much the consumer has to spend 
on everything else that she wants. We can determine that only if we hold 
prices and costs constant in every other market. While adopting such a 
partial equilibrium approach makes the math easier, it conceals the 
distributional choice being made. 
29. See id. at 157–92. 
30. This risk arises from either (i) the theory of the second best, where other markets do not
fully internalize external benefits in the same way, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Dis-
crimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 387 (2008); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copy-
right’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996); or (ii) from the theory of superstar 
or winner-takes-all markets, where the winners capture a higher private value than the social value 
they create. See LUNNEY, supra note 19, at 34–37; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright and the 1%, 23 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
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To illustrate, consider a simple two-good market. In one market is a 
necessity: food.31 Given the applicable legal rules, the market for food is 
competitive. As a result, the food is made available at cost. In the other 
market is a luxury: music. Given the applicable legal rules, the market for 
music entitles music producers to a value-based return, defined as 
willingness to pay. Consumers have identical preferences and starting 
endowments, so we can focus on a single consumer with an initial 
endowment of $100. The cost of supplying the food the consumer wants 
is $20. In a competitive market, that $20 is also the food’s price. The cost 
of supplying the music that the consumer wants is also $20. However, 
because of the legal rules, the price the consumer pays is not the music’s 
cost to produce, but its value to the consumer. Because there are no other 
goods in the market and it is a single period game, the consumer’s 
reservation price for music, defined as what the consumer is willing to pay 
to avoid doing without, is whatever she has left after she buys food. If her 
initial endowment is $100 and she pays a cost-based price for the food of 
$20, she has $80 left over. That is her reservation price for the music, and 
with legal rules that support a value-based price system for music in place, 
that is what our consumer is willing to pay, and will have to pay, for the 
music. Under these assumptions, when a musician creates the music, it 
would seem to have a value of $80. 
However, the notion that the musician has created “value” of $80 is 
an illusion. If the cost of food goes up, so that the consumer now has to 
pay $30 for the food she wants, then the value of the music goes down, 
from $80 to $70. On the other hand, if the cost of food goes down, so that 
the consumer now has to pay $10 for the food she wants, then the value 
of the music goes up, from $80 to $90. Thus, the value of the music 
depends on the cost and price of food. 
Similarly, if the consumer’s initial endowment goes up or down, then 
the value of the music will also change. For example, if the consumer’s 
initial endowment was $110, instead of $100, then the value of the music 
would rise to from $80 to $90. Or if the consumer’s initial endowment 
was $90, instead of $100, then the value of the music would fall from $80 
to $70. Again, the value of the music is not a function of the musician’s 
efforts but of how much the consumer has left after buying food. 
Value is also a function of the applicable legal regime. For example, 
by adopting different legal rules, we could reverse the pricing in the two 
markets. Under a different set of legal rules, the consumer might have to 
31. This discussion is adapted from, and extends, the two-good model I have presented else-
where. See LUNNEY, supra note 19, at 44–49. 
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pay a value-based price for the food she wants and a cost-based price for 
the music. In that case, the consumer would, under the starting 
assumptions, pay $20 for music and $80 for food. In this world, again if 
we define value as the price a consumer is willing to pay, then the value 
of the music drops from $80 to $20. That would be all our consumer would 
be willing to pay for the music because it would be all our consumer had 
left to purchase luxuries, such as music, after she has paid for the 
necessities in her life. That is also the most likely result if law and 
technology enabled perfect price discrimination, and hence value-based 
pricing, in both markets. In this variation, the value of the music does not 
depend on the effort of the musician, but on the pricing rules in the market 
for food. 
As this example illustrates, if we define the value of music as the 
price the consumer is willing to pay, the value of music does not depend 
solely on musician’s efforts or the intrinsic quality of the song. Nor does 
it necessarily measure the musician’s contribution to the economy. For a 
song of any given quality, its value, defined as the consumer’s reservation 
price for the music, depends upon the cost of the food, the surplus the 
consumer has left after purchasing her food, and the legal regime that 
controls the price of food. If we hold initial endowment and cost of food 
constant, require cost-based pricing for food and allow value-based 
pricing for music, and focus solely on what the consumer is willing to pay 
for music, it might seem like the musician created a song with a value of 
$80. That perspective reflects myopia, however. The conclusion of but-
for causation is an illusion that a narrow-minded focus on the price of 
music alone drives. If we change the consumer’s initial endowment, or 
the cost of food, or the legal regime for pricing food, the “value” of the 
song would be different. 
In a market economy, no single person creates the value of a thing.32 
As this example illustrates, the price a consumer is willing to pay to avoid 
doing without any one thing in the economy will depend upon the prices 
the consumer has to pay for everything else and the resulting surplus she 
has left to spend on that one thing. Depending on the legal rules, the cost 
of food and music, and the consumer’s initial endowment, the price the 
consumer will be willing to pay for the music can vary, in our example, 
32. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 31, 38
(1989) (“Market value is a socially created phenomenon . . . .”); Lunney, Reexamining Copyright’s 
Incentives-Access Paradigm, supra note 30, at 574. (“Whoever is responsible, factually, for creating 
the physical product itself, the value of the product in our market economy will always be joint be-
cause it depends entirely on whether consumers have any ‘surplus’ resources with which to purchase 
the product.”). 
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anywhere from $20 to $90. As a result, while our musician may have 
created the song, she did not create its value. Factual causation is thus an 
insufficient basis for allocating value in a market economy. 
Moreover, markets do not necessarily award value to those who 
create it. Again, consider our farmer-musician example, where food and 
music both cost $20, and the consumer’s initial endowment is $100. As 
we have seen, if the legal regime ensures cost-based price pricing for food 
and value-based pricing for music, the musician captures $80, and the 
farmer only $20. What if the farmer works harder and through his efforts 
develops an innovation that decreases the cost of food by $10? Surely, the 
market will reward the farmer for adding value through his hard work. But 
it does not. So long as the legal regime ensures cost-based pricing for food, 
the farmer’s hard work will reduce his earnings in the marketplace from 
$20 to $10. The musician’s earnings, on the other hand, will increase from 
$80 to $90. With cost-based pricing for food and value-based pricing for 
music, the musician captures the fruits of the farmer’s labor. 
We can see the same interaction in real world markets. Consider the 
pay for college football coaches. In most states, the highest paid public 
employee is the football coach for the state’s flagship university.33 
However, those higher earnings do not mean the university’s football 
coach is the state employee who creates the most value. Even if you really 
like college football, good coaches are just one of the many factors of 
production that must come together to create the product (college football) 
and its associated revenue. These other factors are every bit as much but-
for causes of the value of college football. However, unlike a good coach, 
some of these other factors do not enjoy market power and therefore 
recover only a cost-based return for their contribution. Indeed, one of the 
most essential factors, the players, are paid nothing at all. As a monopoly 
factor of production, good coaches are able to demand a value-based 
return for their contribution. As a result, they end up collecting a 
disproportionate share of the revenue associated with college football. 
That is why the top college coaches are so highly paid. It is not because 
they create proportionally more value for society than, for example, the 
top collegiate players.34 
33. See Who’s the Highest Paid Person in Your State, ESPN (Mar. 20, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/22454170/highest-paid-state-employees-include-ncaa-
coaches-nick-saban-john-calipari-dabo-swinney-bill-self-bob-huggins [https://perma.cc/DWN6-
RM7X] (stating that in 2017, 31 of the 50 states’ payrolls were topped by a football coach and another 
eight were topped by a men’s basketball coach). 
34. In the professional sports leagues, even the top coaches are not paid more than the most
talented players. 
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As a general rule in our market economy, it is not those who create 
value who become rich, but those who are well positioned, legally and 
technologically, to capture the value others have helped create. More than 
30 years ago now, Professor William Baxter illustrated for me how a 
market would allocate rents or value using a simple hypothetical that 
involved a pair of shoes.35 If each shoe costs $5 to produce, and shoes are 
sold in a competitive market, a pair of shoes will cost $10. Even if every 
consumer’s reservation price for a pair of shoes is $20, consumers would 
still pay only $10 for a pair of shoes. In a competitive market, if any one 
producer tried to raise its price, consumers would simply buy from another 
producer. As a result, the $10 difference between each of our consumer’s 
reservation price and the shoe’s price (and cost) remains in consumers’ 
pocket as consumer surplus. In contrast, if a company holds a monopoly 
over shoe production, then the company will charge a value-based price 
for shoes. Instead of $10 for a pair, each consumer will have to pay $20. 
With a shoe monopoly, the $10 in surplus will convert from consumer 
surplus to producer surplus. Yet, it is not necessary for the company to 
hold a monopoly on both left and right shoes to capture a full monopoly 
profit on shoe production. If the company holds a monopoly only on left 
shoe production, while the right shoes are produced competitively, the 
company will still capture the entire surplus associated with shoe 
production.36 
While simple, this two-shoe hypothetical explains a great deal of 
how markets today allocate surplus or value. Often the richest people 
today do not contribute the most value. Rather, they hold a monopoly 
position on a product that may have little value on its own, but when 
combined with other competitively supplied factors of production, creates 
an exceedingly valuable joint product. Many of the rich in our society 
today are essentially monopolistic left shoemakers. As such, they capture 
the value not only of their own labor, but the value of all of the others who 
contribute to the joint product as well. For example, it is not software 
alone that made personal computers valuable. After all, what would 
Microsoft’s operating systems be worth without the hardware to run it on? 
Instead, it is the combination of hardware and software that made personal 
computers valuable. Yet software producers, such as Microsoft executives 
Bill Gates, Paul Allen, and Steve Ballmer, became far richer than the 
35. I first recounted this example elsewhere. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Comment, Atari v. Nin-
tendo: Does a Closed System Violate the Antitrust Law?, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 29, 39–41 (1990). 
36. Id. In this situation, the right shoe is priced competitively at its cost of $5, and the left shoe 
is priced at $15. This price enables the left shoe maker to capture the full $10 surplus associated not 
with the left shoe alone, but with a pair of shoes.  
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executives of personal computer hardware manufacturers because 
copyright made the Microsoft operating system a monopoly complement 
to the personal computer hardware that others provided in largely 
competitive, and therefore cost-based, markets.37 
Similarly, it is not Google’s search engine alone that is valuable. 
After all, what would an Internet search engine be worth if there were no 
content on the Internet? Instead, it is the combination of that search engine 
with all of the Internet’s wondrous content that is valuable. Yet, the 
founders of Google became rich in a way that those who helped contribute 
to the Internet’s wondrous content did not.38 Just like football coaches and 
Microsoft software, Google’s search engine was a monopoly complement 
to the Internet content others provided, largely on a cost basis. Google’s 
owners therefore captured the full value not of their search engine alone, 
but of a searchable Internet full of wondrous content. Other examples 
abound. In today’s economy, platforms such as eBay, Uber, and Facebook 
are all effectively monopolistic left shoemakers. As the two-shoe 
hypothetical and these real-world examples illustrate, to capture a full 
monopoly profit on the joint product, all you need is a monopoly over one 
of the necessary factors of production. Yet, despite capturing the full value 
of the associated joint product, these monopolistic left shoemakers are 
only one of the but-for causes of that joint product and its associated 
market value. 
In a generally competitive market economy, the two-shoe 
hypothetical extends far beyond these specific cases of joint products. At 
some level, in a generally competitive economy, goods in one market are 
complements to goods in all other markets. As the two-good model 
featuring food and music above illustrated, if a consumer has more surplus 
left over after purchasing food, she can afford to purchase more luxuries, 
such as music, that she enjoys. In which case, a monopoly over any one 
market can enable the monopolist to extract the full surplus from the 
economy as a whole. For the consumer who needs a life-saving 
37. Two of these three Microsoft executives, Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer, are still on the
Forbes list of the richest people in the world. See Billionaires: The Richest People in the World, 
FORBES (Mar. 5, 2019) (identifying Bill Gates as the second richest with $96.5 billion and Steve 
Ballmer as the 19th richest with $41.2 billion). At the time of his death in 2018, Paul Allen was the 
44th richest with $20.3 billion. Megan Elliott, Microsoft’s Paul Allen: His Net Worth and All the 
Businesses He Was Involved In Over the Years, SHOWBIZCHEATSHEET (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.cheatsheet.com/entertainment/microsofts-paul-allen-his-net-worth-and-all-the-busi-
nesses-he-was-involved-in-over-the-years.html/ [https://perma.cc/K9Z2-UQUQ]. In contrast, on the 
hardware side, only Michael Dell breaks the top 50 as the 25th richest with $34.3 billion.  
38. On the Google side, Larry Page is the tenth richest person according to Forbes with $50.8
billion, and Sergey Brin is the 14th with $49.8 billion. FORBES, supra note 37. 
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medication or who, at least metaphorically, cannot live without her 
favorite song, there is little difference between living in an economy with 
a monopoly on that medication or song alone and living in an economy 
with a monopoly on every available good. For the producer that is looking 
to capture the economy’s full surplus through monopolistic pricing, there 
is no need to hold a monopoly position in all markets. It is enough that the 
producer holds a monopoly on any life-sustaining or life-improving 
good.39 As the two-good model featuring music and food above 
illustrates, whether the producer holds a monopoly on food, music, or 
both, the result is the same. The producer captures, and the consumer pays 
over her full surplus. Only the heterogeneity of consumers, varying 
degrees of market power held by different entities in different markets, 
and our own preconceptions prevent us from seeing the model’s 
predictions fully realized in the economy as a whole. 
As a result, rather than factual or but-for causation, we must look for 
other principles to govern our decision as to how to distribute society’s 
surplus. At the outset, I suggested that those principles would focus on 
two issues: (i) to whom we allocate the surplus; and (ii) whether we should 
concentrate the surplus in the hands of the lucky few or disperse it to the 
many. My approach on these two principle is simple. With respect to the 
first, I would devise legal rules that generate markets that allocate more 
of the surplus to those who share, and in ways that reflect and reinforce, 
my values. On the second, I would disperse rather than concentrate that 
surplus. 
The first principle has a stark version: Don’t give society’s surplus 
to those who will use it to try and kill me or those for whom I care. Al 
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden provide a historical illustration of what 
happens when we fail to follow this principle.40 But there is also a more 
generalizable version. Wealth is power. When we allocate more of 
society’s surplus to a particular individual or group, we give that 
individual or group more power to shape our society moving forward. If 
we give more of society’s surplus to individuals who value faith, family, 
and country, they are likely to use the power that surplus gives them to 
build a society with similar values. If, on the other hand, we give more of 
society’s surplus to pleasure-seeking hedonists, then we should not be 
surprised to find that our society becomes increasingly hedonistic. We 
should therefore be careful to allocate surplus to those whose values we 
39. As long as there are no other monopolists in the economy.
40. It also illustrates that “we” do not all share the same values. 
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share and to those who will use the power that surplus gives them to forge 
a society that values what we value.41 
We see this principle at play in the debate over Article 17. In 
advancing the “value gap” argument in favor of Article 17, proponents of 
broader copyright emphasized the critical cultural role artists and authors 
play. In his open letter supporting what became Article 17, Sir Paul 
McCartney, for example, wrote: “Music and culture matter. They are our 
heart and soul.”42 In its materials supporting Article 17, the IFPI 
emphasized the same soundbite: “Music and the arts are at the heart of 
European identity and culture, they reflect and celebrate our core 
values.”43 
Copyright supports artists and authors. As a statement of values that 
we should support, who could possibly oppose that? Yet, when we move 
from consequentialist copyright, where copyright protection increases 
creative output, to distributional copyright, where it no longer does, 
copyright protection becomes a zero sum, or perhaps a negative sum, 
game. With distributional copyright, we must abandon the pretense that 
copyright can advance the interests of both copyright creators and 
copyright consumers alike. With distributional copyright, supporting 
artists and authors by giving them a larger share of society’s surplus 
necessarily comes at the cost of giving less to everyone else. Thus, it is 
not that I oppose authors and artists, it is that I chose to support teachers, 
nurses and doctors, engineers, construction and factory workers, farmers 
and ranchers, and all the others who make our civilization possible. As a 
statement of values, who could oppose that? 
In determining to whom society’s surplus should go, the question 
becomes: What kind of society do we want to create, and what kind of 
work do we want to value? For example, do we want to reward form or 
substance? Should we establish legal rules that yield a market that 
generates a larger payday for Neil Armstrong, who actually walked on the 
moon, or for Ryan Gosling, who portrayed Neil Armstrong in a movie? 
With the broad copyright protection our laws currently provide, Ryan 
Gosling earned more. If we had no copyright, or a much shorter and 
narrower copyright, Neil Armstrong would have earned more. Similarly, 
do we want to establish legal rules that yield higher returns for the 
members of our military, first responders, and teachers, or for actors who 
41. Obviously, to the extent you and I disagree on those values, each of us should strive to
allocate surplus to those who share my or your respective values. 
42. Letter of Sir Paul McCartney to European Parliament, supra note 13.
43. THE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE: 5 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW, supra note 14.
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portray them on television? Again, broad copyright will lead to markets 
with higher returns for the actors; narrower or no copyright will lead to 
markets where actors do not earn disproportionately more than those they 
portray. For me, the notion that we should have such broad copyright 
protection that Ryan Gosling earns more for portraying Neil Armstrong 
than Neil Armstrong earned himself is a travesty—a mockery of all that I 
hold just. 
Sir McCartney and the IFPI insist that music and the arts are the core 
of our civilization. But they are not. The core of our civilization is more 
banal: drinkable water, efficient sewer systems, sufficient food and 
housing, adequate medical care, and an effective education system. It is 
only once we have those essentials that luxuries such as music begin to 
matter. For those who are unpersuaded, I have a simple proposition. I will 
do without music created by others for a month, if you will do without 
food grown, raised, or caught by others for the same period. It is only from 
a certain, incredibly entitled perspective that one can view music and the 
arts as the core of our civilization. 
There are undoubtedly some individuals who have captured large 
slices of the social surplus under our current copyright regime and who 
also happen to share my values. Yet, for the most part, the values of the 
modern entertainment industry that copyright protects and enables are far 
from, if not anathema, to my own. I prefer copyright minimalism to 
copyright maximalism because I believe that adopting copyright 
minimalism will allocate more of society’s surplus to those who share my 
values. Simply put, I would rather live in a society where the Neil 
Armstrongs of the world have more power to shape that society’s future 
than the Ryan Goslings. Even knowing nothing regarding the content of 
their respective characters, the nature of the work performed would lead 
me to give Neil Armstrong more influence over the shape of our society 
than Ryan Gosling. After all, Neil Armstrong worked with others on a 
day-in-day-out basis for years and risked his life to accomplish what no 
person before him had. In contrast, over the course of a few months, Ryan 
Gosling read words written by another and followed the direction of yet 
others (trying) to create the appearance of someone we liked and cared 
about. If I am going to entrust one of these individuals with more of 
society’s surplus, and hence more financial, political, and culture power 
to shape our society’s future, on that basis alone, I would entrust more of 
society’s surplus to the people who actually did something—people like 
Neil Armstrong. 
How we allocate society’s surplus also shapes our perceptions of 
who matters in our society. It helps determine who our heroes are. If we 
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adopt copyright minimalism, we allocate more of the surplus to 
astronauts, doctors, teachers, and fire fighters. With copyright 
maximalism, on the other hand, we allocate more to rock and movie stars. 
We used to be a nation of people who do things. Increasingly it seems, we 
are becoming a nation of people who watch as others pretend to do things. 
Moreover, the choice between copyright minimalism and copyright 
maximalism may tend to hold up one group or the other to our children as 
the people whose opinion matter in our society. But that is extremely 
problematic. As much as I enjoy Alyssa Milano as an actress, her views 
on vaccinations are simply wrong. Yet, the wealth and fame that copyright 
maximalism bestows on her gives her a platform to espouse her views, as 
if they mattered as much or more than those of medical and public health 
professionals who are better informed on the subject. 
I recognize, of course, that you may disagree. You may value form 
over substance. You may believe that Ryan Gosling should earn more for 
pretending to walk on the moon than Neil Armstrong earned for actually 
walking on it. You may prefer to live in a society where Ryan Gosling has 
more power, financially, politically, and culturally, than Neil Armstrong 
to shape that society’s future. The difficulties in implementing the first 
principle are thus two-fold. First, even if we agree on what constitutes a 
better society, we may find it difficult to allocate society’s surplus in a 
way that leads to that better society. Second, we may disagree on what 
constitutes a better society. While these difficulties exist, they do not 
undermine the central truth underlying the first principle. Those to whom 
we allocate more of society’s surplus will have more power to shape 
society moving forward. We should therefore allocate more of society’s 
surplus to those who will use it to create the sort of society in which we 
want to live. If we cannot tell how to do that, or we are deadlocked on 
what values we want to promote, then those problems lead us to the 
second principle. 
Given a choice between concentrating surplus in the hands of the 
lucky few and dispersing it to the many, we should disperse the available 
surplus to the many. Dispersing the surplus and ensuring a more even 
distribution of income allocates the power to shape society and its values 
to the many rather than the idiosyncratic few. On any given issue, whether 
religious beliefs or gender equality, there are likely to be a range of 
perspectives. As an alternative to the first principle, under which we 
allocate surplus to those who share our own perspective, the second 
principle, ensuring income equality and dispersing the surplus, tends to 
ensure that the surplus is allocated proportionally to the fraction of the 
population that holds a particular perspective. It thereby allocates wealth, 
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and thus power, to the majority. If we define as extreme those perspectives 
held by a very small fraction of the population, dispersing the surplus 
evenly tends to allocate a correspondingly small fraction of the surplus to 
those with extreme views. Income equality thus tends to minimize the 
influence of those who hold extreme views in two ways. First, it allocates 
extremists a proportionally smaller slice of the surplus to use to promote 
their views. Second, income equality also allocates the majority non-
extremists a proportionally larger slice of the surplus to use as 
overwhelming counterweight. 
The alternative, where we concentrate the surplus in the hands of the 
lucky few, risks handing a disproportionate share of the social surplus to 
someone who holds extremist views. Of course, sometimes concentrating 
surplus in the hands of the lucky few will turn out well for society when 
the few use that wealth and power to build a better society. But there is no 
necessary correlation between the desire to do good for society and the 
ability to capture a large share of society’s surplus. When laws and 
markets allocate large slices of society’s surplus to the lucky few, and do 
so randomly with respect to the few’s intent for using that surplus, it is 
just as likely that the few will devote that surplus and the power it gives 
them to promote values contrary to those held by the majority. 
Thus, to better align use of the surplus with the values held by the 
majority, a more equal distribution of income that disperses society’s 
surplus among the many is preferable to concentrating it among the 
random few. For that reason, copyright minimalism is preferable to 
copyright maximalism. Copyright maximalism tends to concentrate 
extreme wealth and hence power in the hands of the randomly selected 
few. We can demonstrate this empirically by examining the Gini 
coefficient for copyright and non-copyright income. Named after Italian 
sociologist Corrado Gini, who first proposed it, the Gini coefficient is a 
statistical measure of equal distribution.44 With perfect equality in income 
distribution, each citizen in a society earns exactly the same amount. With 
such perfect equality, the Gini coefficient is zero. In contrast with perfect 
inequality, one citizen earns everything, and everyone else earns nothing. 
In such a society, the Gini coefficient would be one or 100%. Today, the 
most common use of the Gini coefficient is as a measure of the extent to 
which income in a society is evenly distributed. The Central Intelligence 
Agency, for example, has estimated that worldwide, Gini coefficients on 
family income range from over 60% in countries such as Lesotho, South 
Africa, and Haiti, where income distribution is highly unequal, to under 
44. See Corrado Gini, Measurement of Inequality of Incomes, 31 ECON. J. 124 (1921).
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30% for countries such as Germany, Norway, and Sweden, where income 
is more equally distributed.45 The CIA estimates the Gini coefficient for 
the United States as 45%, falling between Iran at 44.5% and Saudi Arabia 
at 45.9%.46 
While the Gini coefficient for family income in the United States 
may seem high, it is nothing compared to the Gini coefficients for income 
or demand distribution in various copyright markets. Table 1 provides 
estimates for Gini coefficients for a variety of copyright markets. 
Table 1.Copyright is Distributive Injustice: Gini Coefficients in 
Copyright Markets47 
Market Gini Coefficient 
2018 Album Sales 0.9827 
2019 Domestic Box Office  0.9209 
1993 UK Songwriter PRS Royalties 0.9591 
Distribution of Players on Steam PC Videogames 0.9925 
2018 U.K. Author Copyright Income 0.74 
The very high Gini coefficients in the markets for copyrighted works 
that Table 1 presents, reflect the winner-takes-all nature of these markets. 
A handful of superstar artists and authors capture nearly all the income, 
45. Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: Distribution of Family Income – Gini 
Index, THE WORD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankor-
der/2172rank.html [https://perma.cc/4DBH-SB3H].  
46. Id. 
47. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Excess Revisited, 6 TEXAS A&M PROP. L.J. (forth-
coming 2020). The Gini coefficients in Table 1 are calculated from data in Lunney, Copyright and 
the 1%, supra note 30; MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMM’N, PERFORMING RIGHTS: A REPORT ON 
THE SUPPLY IN THE U.K. OF THE SERVICES OF ADMINISTERING PERFORMING RIGHTS AND FILM 
SYNCHRONIZATION RIGHTS 65 (1996); Domestic Box Office For 2019, BOX OFFICE MOJO (Oct. 7, 
2019), https://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly/chart/?page=1&view=releasedate&view2=domes-
tic&yr=2019&p=.htm [https://perma.cc/NA87-9562]; MARTIN KRETSCHMER ET AL., UK AUTHORS’ 
EARNINGS AND CONTRACTS 2018: A SURVEY OF 50,000 WRITERS 20 (2019); BuzzAngle Music Ad-
min, BuzzAngle Music 2018 Report on Music Consumption, BUZZANGLE MUSIC (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://www.buzzanglemusic.com/buzzangle-music-2018-report-on-music-consumption/ 
[https://perma.cc/525V-RMWZ]. 
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leaving only scraps for the rest.48 By way of contrast, the Gini coefficient 
on skilled labor income in the U.K. was 0.13.49 
It may be that a Gini coefficient greater than zero is necessary to 
maximize output in a society by ensuring higher rewards for those who 
are more productive. It may also be that a Gini coefficient too close to one 
will reduce a society’s output by leading to social unrest, reducing 
opportunity for those with less, and pushing some of the most successful 
onto the backward-bending portion of the labor supply curve. In our tale 
of two copyrights, however, we put these efficiency concerns to one side. 
The question we are asking is how to distribute society’s income if we 
assume that how we distribute society’s income will have no effect on 
output. Under that assumption, the goal is to distribute income across 
society as evenly as possible. In other words, if unequal income 
distribution does not increase output, we should strive for a Gini 
coefficient of zero. 
Copyright maximalism will not serve that distributional goal. As the 
Gini coefficients in Table 1 establish, the demand in the markets for 
copyrighted works is highly skewed. The top ten percent of the works, 
whether books, movies, songs, or videogames, captures from 70 to nearly 
100% of the demand and hence income.50 As a result, rather than disperse 
society’s surplus more broadly by ensuring income equality, copyright 
maximalism does just the opposite. Because most copyright markets are 
winner-takes-all, or at best winner-takes-most, copyright maximalism 
tends to concentrate society’s surplus in the hands of a very few superstar 
authors and artists. The more of a society’s income that is channeled 
through the copyright system, the more unequal income distribution in 
that society becomes. 
Moreover, copyright selects the winners in its winner-takes-all 
markets on the basis of characteristics such as looks, voice, likability, or 
48. Some of the numbers in Table 1 reflect income distribution to corporate entities that may 
in turn be redistributed to executives and shareholders in ways that reduce the Gini coefficients. How-
ever, two of the figures—that for UK songwriters and that for UK authors—reflect final payouts to 
individuals. The Gini coefficients, even for those individual incomes, remain sharply higher than the 
Gini coefficient for income generally, even compared to the countries with the highest levels of in-
come inequality, such as Haiti and South Africa. 
49. See KRETSCHMER ET AL., supra note 47, at 20. 
50. See Lunney, Copyright and the 1%, supra note 30 (estimating that the top ten percent of
videogames on Steam captured nearly 90% of the videogame players); Domestic Box Office For 2019, 
supra note 47 (providing data that shows that the top ten percent of movies earned 75.5% of the 
domestic box office from January 1, 2019 through October 6, 2019); KRETSCHMER ET AL., supra note 
47, at 20 (estimating that 70% of copyright income for books flowed to the top ten percent of authors); 
BuzzAngle Music Admin, supra note 47 (providing data that shows that the top ten percent of albums 
captured over 98.5% of sales). 
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programming skills, which are almost entirely orthogonal to whether any 
given winner will use the resulting surplus allocated to them to build a 
better society or destroy it entirely. Winning the copyright lottery does not 
even require the extensive schooling or long apprenticeship periods that 
success in other fields, such as medicine, law, or business, often requires. 
While not perfect screens, both extensive schooling and long 
apprenticeships can help weed out those whose values are entirely 
antithetical to society’s before bestowing wealth on them. 
In the end, whether copyright bestows vast wealth on its chosen few 
more or less randomly than other market mechanisms, or the legal rules 
governing inheritance for that matter, is not the key point. I frankly 
acknowledge that generally the market is not a meritocracy. As discussed, 
the market does not bestow larger slices of society’s surplus on those who 
create more value or who are otherwise more deserving. Rather the market 
bestows larger slices of society’s surplus on those for whom a lucky 
combination of government regulation, legal rules, and technology 
enables a value-based or monopolistic, rather than a cost-based or 
competitive return. The key point is that any set of legal rules, such as 
copyright maximalism, that tends to concentrate society’s surplus in the 
hands of the lucky few risks giving those few the power to shape society 
in ways contrary to the values of the majority of the population. For this 
reason, a more even distribution of surplus is preferable. Because 
copyright markets tend to be winner-takes-all, copyright minimalism 
tends to ensure such an even distribution. That puts the power to shape the 
future of our society in the hands of the majority of the population. In a 
representative democracy, that is where the power, in my opinion, 
belongs. 
V. ARTICLE 17 AND THE VALUE GAP REVISITED 
The copyright maximalism Article 17 embodies is therefore 
generally undesirable. However, Article 17 itself seeks to redistribute 
wealth in the one situation where copyright maximalism may tend to 
disperse rather than concentrate society’s surplus. Specifically, it seeks to 
force Internet platforms generally, and YouTube specifically, to share 
more of their rents with copyright owners and related rights holders. 
Where an intermediary in a copyright market is a natural monopoly, 
broader, rather than narrower, copyright can force that intermediary to 
share its natural monopoly rents with copyright owners. Moreover, it can 
do so without directly raising the price for access to the copyrighted works 
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at issue to consumers. In that one situation, copyright maximalism may 
have some tendency to disperse society’s surplus. 
Take broadcast radio, for example.51 If there were competition 
between radio stations in a given market, and consumers disliked listening 
to advertisements, then each station would run only enough ads to cover 
its operating costs. If any given station tried to raise its “price” by running 
more ads, consumers would simply switch to another station. In such a 
competitive intermediary market, creating a public performance right and 
requiring the stations to pay a public performance royalty for broadcasting 
copyrighted music would require more ads to cover that additional cost. 
As a result, broader copyright would reduce access to music. Before 
enacting a public performance right, we would therefore have to consider 
whether some efficiency gain, such as increased creative output from the 
license royalties, justified that lost access. However, the market for radio 
broadcasts may not be so competitive. Traditional analog radio has high-
fixed and low-marginal costs and must broadcast over a limited frequency 
spectrum. As a result, even without copyright, broadcast radio has a 
natural monopoly character. If there is only one radio station playing a 
certain genre of music in a given geographic area, and again consumers 
dislike ads, that station will run ads until its profits are maximized. It will 
trade off more money from more ads against less money from fewer 
listeners to identify the percentage of airtime to devote to advertisements 
so that the station maximizes its profits. 
In such a natural monopoly setting, adopting a public performance 
right will not increase the number of ads the station runs. There is 
therefore no lost access. But such a public performance right will force 
the radio station to share some of its monopoly rents with the songwriters 
who made those rents possible. Thus, any tendency for the resulting 
royalties to increase creative output may justify enactment of a public 
performance right in such a natural monopoly setting. More importantly 
for the purpose of this discussion, even if there is no increase in creative 
output, and requiring public performance royalties merely redistribute 
rents from the radio station to songwriters, in this one setting, that rent 
redistribution may have some tendency to disperse society’s surplus. It 
can redistribute at least some of rents from the one, the radio station, to 
the more than one, the songwriters. 
I believe that is what Article 17 is trying to do. It is an attempt to 
force YouTube to share more of its rents with copyright owners and 
51. I have first explored this example elsewhere. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Aereo and Copy-
right’s Private-Public Performance Line, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 205 (2014).  
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related rights holders without increasing the price of YouTube to 
consumers.52 If Article 17 could accomplish this result, then it might serve 
to disperse rather than concentrate society’s surplus, and, based upon our 
distributional principles, be desirable. Unfortunately, it is not likely to 
achieve this goal. 
One key difference between traditional analog intermediaries, such 
as radio broadcasters, and the new digital intermediaries, such as 
YouTube, is that the digital intermediaries are not necessarily natural 
monopolies. On the Internet, a bandwidth limit does exist, but it does not 
bind as tightly as the frequency limit for radio broadcasts. Moreover, the 
cost structure is not the same. On the Internet, there could, as a practical 
matter, be dozens, if not thousands, of video sharing sites or music 
streaming services. Yet, there are only a few. If we look for the reason 
why, we find copyright. It is copyright that has made YouTube the 
monopoly it is today. The high cost of copyright licensing, together with 
the high cost of defending against bogus copyright infringement claims, 
have imposed an unnatural monopoly character on Internet intermediaries 
that would not otherwise be present. Consider Veoh, for example. Veoh 
sought to become a video sharing website similar to, and in direct 
competition with, YouTube. Copyright owners sued the website, as well 
as its investors, for copyright infringement (and sued YouTube as well). 
After nearly six years of litigation, Veoh prevailed.53 Even so, it spent its 
money on litigation, rather than innovation. (YouTube was able to afford 
defending against similar baseless copyright claims only because Google 
bought it.) As a result, Veoh has yet to become an effective substitute for 
YouTube. 
From a distributional perspective, it would be preferable to introduce 
competition into the markets of these platform intermediaries. By doing 
so, we could redistribute some of the rents YouTube and other platforms 
are now capturing and return them back to consumers. To disperse rather 
than concentrate society’s surplus, we should strive to reduce the rents 
that YouTube is capturing. Proponents of Article 17 do not share that goal. 
They are perfectly happy to allow YouTube to capture even more rents as 
long as copyright owners and related rights holders get a larger share of 
those rents. Ironically, they believe that the answer to a problem that 
copyright created is more copyright. The funny thing is, Article 17 is 
likely to cement YouTube’s monopoly position by raising the costs of 
52. In terms of politics, it is also an attempt to redistribute rents from an American company,
YouTube, to copyright owners and related rights holders, at least some of whom are European.  
53. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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entry for future, would-be competitors. As a result, the most likely 
consequence of Article 17’s enactment is to increase YouTube’s rents, but 
decrease the share of those rents going to copyright owners and related 
rights holders. 
Indeed, precisely to the extent that it raises the cost to enter the video 
sharing market, Article 17 is likely to decrease the licensing fees YouTube 
pays copyright owners and related rights holders. With its state of the art, 
ContentID system, YouTube probably already complies with Article 17. 
Thus, enacting Article 17 changes nothing for YouTube itself. However, 
enacting Article 17 imposes substantial compliance costs on potential new 
entrants into the video sharing market. It thereby creates a barrier to entry. 
This will tend to reinforce YouTube’s monopoly position. As a monopoly 
supplier of video content, YouTube can extract rents from its customers—
those who view videos. Reinforcing that market power by creating a new 
barrier to entry will tend to make those rents higher. At the same time and 
precisely to the same extent that YouTube is a monopoly supplier of 
videos on the Internet, YouTube is also a monopsony buyer of that same 
video content.54 As such, reinforcing YouTube’s market power will tend 
to reduce the price it pays for that content. This, at least, is the prediction 
of traditional economic theory. When a company has market power as a 
good’s seller, or “monopoly,” consumers of that good pay higher prices. 
When a company has market power as a good’s buyer, or “monopsony,” 
suppliers of that good receive a lower price. If that theory proves accurate 
in this case, Article 17 will tend to increase the rents YouTube captures 
but reduce the rents it shares with copyright owners and related rights 
holders. 
Moreover, even if we assume that YouTube is a natural monopoly 
because of network effects, and even if we assume further that Article 17 
will achieve some rent redistribution from YouTube to copyright owners 
and related rights holders, Article 17 would still leave society’s surplus 
far more concentrated than an approach that sought to reduce YouTube’s 
rents directly. Indeed, it is far from clear, as a purely distributional matter, 
that any redistribution Article 17 achieves will materially or significantly 
disperse society’s surplus. Like other copyright markets, the demand for 
videos on YouTube is not quite winner-takes-all, but it is highly skewed. 
In the music video market, nearly 90% of views go to the top ten percent 
of the videos.55 As a result, any rents Article 17 redistributed to copyright 
54. JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1969).
55. See BuzzAngle Music Admin, supra note 47 (showing that of just under 500,000 music
videos streamed in 2018, the top 50,000 or roughly ten percent received 87.1% of the total music 
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owners and related rights would remain highly concentrated. If our 
distributional goal is to disperse society’s surplus evenly across all 
members of society, Article17 will not achieve that. At best or worst, 
depending on one’s perspective, Article 17 will merely redistribute a slice 
of society’s surplus from one small group of computer programmers, and 
their associated investors and shareholders, to a different, but equally 
small group of songwriters and musicians, and their associated investors 
and shareholders. 
VI. THE PROBLEM WITH A VALUE-BASED ECONOMY
Distributional choices have consequences. In thinking about those 
consequences, the first step is to be honest when legal change is designed 
to achieve distributional, rather than efficiency, goals. Honesty will open 
up additional solutions that can address the issue with fewer unintended 
consequences. If the goal is to redistribute some revenue from YouTube 
to YouTube stars, Article 17 is not the answer. To the contrary, it is likely 
to make the existing distributional problem worse. If the goal is purely 
distributional, an express tax-and-redistribution scheme can almost 
always achieve the redistributive goals with fewer unintended 
consequences than an adjustment of property rights.56 Of course, being 
honest has its downsides. First, for those seeking the redistribution, their 
demands become less persuasive. I cannot see any reason to spend scarce 
resources trying to redistribute wealth from one group of rich people, such 
as Larry Page and Sergey Brin, just to give it to a different group of rich 
people, such as Paul McCartney. Second, and more problematically, once 
naked redistribution becomes the acknowledged norm, individuals will 
start investing more of their available resources in socially wasteful rent-
seeking and less to productive economic activities. People will invest their 
scarce resources in lobbyists as they squabble over how to divide the 
existing pie, rather than invest those resources in baking three more. 
Nevertheless, if we are going to enact laws to achieve redistributive 
goals, as Congress and the EU have recently done in the copyright space, 
then such redistributions should follow two principles. First, ensure legal 
rules that will lead more of society’s surplus to those who will do good 
with it. Often, however, we cannot be sure who that will be. We may even 
disagree on what constitutes “good.” For me, at least, on this principle, 
those who copyright has made rich are among the last people to whom I 
video streams). 
56. This, of course, is the general conclusion of law and economics scholars on this issue. See, 
e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 7–9 (6th ed. 2012). 
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would entrust society’s surplus. More generally, however, I would prefer 
to focus on the second principle in making distributional choices: Adopt 
the legal rule that disperses, rather than concentrates, society’s surplus. 
This leads to a preference for competitive markets generally. With respect 
to copyright specifically, copyright markets tend towards winner-takes-
all. As a result, this “disperse the surplus” principle leads to a strong 
preference for copyright minimalism over copyright maximalism. 
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